Month: October 2007

Following the recent period of events involving aircraft of the Dash 8 Q400 type, SAS’s management, following an unscheduled meeting of the Board of Directors held today, has decided to immediately discontinue the use of this type of aircraft.

“Confidence in the Q400 has diminished considerably and our customers are becoming increasingly doubtful about flying in this type of aircraft. Accordingly, with the Board of Directors’ approval, I have decided to immediately remove Dash 8 Q400 aircraft from service,” says Mats Jansson, President and Chief Executive Officer of SAS.

In January 2000, SAS was the first customer to use the Dash 8 Q400 in its traffic operations. The aircraft have accounted for approximately 5 percent of the Group’s passengers. The aim is to replace traffic based on the Q400 by reallocating current aircraft in the SAS Group’s fleet and by means of leasing.

“The Dash 8 Q400 has given rise to repeated quality-related problems and we can now conclude that the aircraft does not match our passengers’ requirements concerning punctuality and regularity. SAS’s flight operations have always enjoyed an excellent reputation and there is a risk that use of the Dash 8 Q400 could eventually damage the SAS brand,” says John Dueholm, Deputy CEO of SAS.

Due to the decision, SAS’s traffic services will be affected by flight cancellations in the period immediately ahead. The customers concerned will be given an opportunity to either rebook or have their tickets refunded. For detailed information about traffic services, reference is made to www.sas.dk

The aircraft operates on Danish and Swedish domestic as well as on European routes. In addition, it is operated by Widerøe in Norway.

In total 27 aircraft of SAS Group fleet of 303 aircraft are affected, accounting for approx 5% of total aircraft seat capacity.

SAS Group will do everything possible to mitigate the negative consequences for the passengers. Short and medium term SAS will take the following actions to handle the replacement of the Q400 fleet (with estimated time frame)

1. Review of network and reallocation of aircraft capacity within the SAS group (0-3 months)
2. External wet lease capacity (0-1 month)
3. External dry lease capacity (3-6 months)

In parallel, work has already been initiated how to replace the aircraft type long term. SAS expect to start to implement a long-term solution by second half of 2008.

SAS Group is in dialog with Bombardier regarding possible solutions regarding the current situation for the Q400 fleet including compensation.

Statement by Bombardier
Bombardier is disappointed with the SAS decision to permanently discontinue flight operations with the Bombardier Q400 aircraft given that the landing incident is still under investigation by Danish authorities.

While SAS chose to ground its Q400 turboprop fleet following the incident on October 27, 2007, Bombardier’s assessment of this situation, in consultation with Transport Canada, did not identify a systemic landing gear issue. Based on this we advised all Q400 aircraft operators that they should continue with normal Q400 aircraft flight operations. Further, Bombardier and the landing gear manufacturer, Goodrich, have completed a full review of the Q400 turboprop landing gear system and results have confirmed its safe design and operational integrity.

Bombardier stands behind the Q400 aircraft. Since entering revenue service in February 2000, the Q400 turboprop has proven itself to be a safe and reliable aircraft with over 150 Q400 aircraft in operation among 22 operators around the world. To date, the fleet of Q400 aircraft has logged over one million flying hours and 1.2 million take-off and landing cycles.

It will be interesting to see which aircraft type will be used as replacement.

UPDATE: Preliminary Investigation Report on SAS Dash 8-Q400 LN-RDI Accident in Copenhagen

It’s unbelievable! AGAIN a landing gear collapse occured on a Dash 8 – Q400 during landing. Again the right main landing gear collapsed and again it happened to an SAS plane in Copenhagen (Denmark)! SAS now again grounded its entire fleet of Dash 8-400.

Credit: jp.dk

• On 09 September on a SAS Dash 8-400 (Q400) collapsed the right main landing gear during landing at Aalborg (Denmark).
• On 12 September on a SAS Dash 8-400 (Q400) collapsed the right main landing gear during landing at Palanga (Lithuania). SAS grounds entire fleet & worldwide most Dash 8-400 (Q400) are grounded.
• On 21 September a Lufthansa Regional Dash 8-400 (Q400) was involved in a front gear incident.
• The investigation revealed the accidents were caused by an actuator in the main landing gear that was affected by corrosion.
• SAS replaced all actuators on all of its Dash 8-400 (Q400).
• In early October SAS returned its Dash8/Q400 fleet back to service.

It will be interesting to see how the other operators and the manufacturer Bombardier will respond.

Official SAS Press Release:
Scandinavian Airlines regrets to confirm that one of its aircraft, a Dash 8- 400 with registration number LN-RDI and flight number SK 2867 from Bergen to Copenhagen was involved in an accident at Copenhagen airport, at 16.55 hrs local time today.

We can confirm that there were 38 passengers and 2 infants and 4 crew members onboard. No one was injured.

SAS is doing everything possible to assist all passengers. Practically all passengers are continuing on connecting flights to their final destinations.
The SAS Group has decided to ground the entire fleet of Dash 8-400 aircraft until further notice.
Passengers booked on cancelled flights until October 29 can either rebook or be refunded.

Photo: http://politiken.dk/indland/article407463.ece
Video: http://jp.dk/webtv/webtv_indland/?movieId=14298&Id=1145841

UPDATE – Bombardier Press Release
Bombardier Q400 Scandinavian Flight Sk2867 Incident

Toronto, October 27, 2007

Bombardier confirms that a Bombardier Q400 aircraft S/N 4024 registration number LN-RDI operating as flight SK2867 from Bergen to Copenhagen, was involved in an incident at Copenhagen Airport at 16:55 local time on October 27, 2007. There were no reported injuries to the 40 passengers and 4 crew members on board.

According to preliminary information, the incident involved the main right hand landing gear, which failed to fully extend for landing. There appears to be no relationship between this incident and previous SAS Q400 main landing gear incidents. While SAS has decided to ground their Q400 fleet until further notice, Bombardier has advised all Q400 operators via an All Operator Message (AOM) of this incident but is not recommending changes to their normal on-going Q400 flight operations.

Bombardier is cooperating fully with SAS and the investigating aviation authorities and has dispatched a product safety and technical team to the site to fully support and assist in the investigation. Until such time as the authorities release any information or findings, Bombardier cannot comment further or speculate on the potential cause of this incident.

The final NTSC investigation report of Garuda Indonesia flight GA200 has been released. The Boeing 737-497 (PK-GZC) crashed on 07 March 2007 during landing at Yogyakarta (Indonesia), killing 20 passengers and 1 flight attendant.

The report holds the pilot and copilot responsible for this accident and blames the Yogyakarta Airport rescue and fire fighting services for the lack of proper equipment, delays and an ineffective emergency plan.
The pilot is accused for doing an unstabilized approach, with too high altitude resulting in a steep flight path angle, at too high airspeed, ignoring several GPWS warnings and warnings made by the copilot and not doing a go-around.
The copilot is accused for not following company procedures and not taking control of the aircraft from the pilot when he noticed that the pilot in command repeatedly ignored all alerts and warnings.

Following the most important, related quotes from the final investigation report. For the full report please visit the link below.

The PIC intended to make an instrument landing system (ILS) approach to runway 09 at Yogyakarta
and briefed the copilot accordingly. Yogya Approach cleared the aircraft for a visual approach, with a
requirement to proceed to long final and report runway in sight. Although the crew acknowledged the
visual approach clearance, they continued with the ILS approach, but did not inform the controller. The
descent and approach were conducted in visual meteorological conditions.

At 23:55:33, when the aircraft was 10.1 miles from the runway, it was 1,427 feet above the initial fix of
2,500 feet published in the approach chart, and the airspeed was 283 knots. The pilot in command
descended the aircraft steeply in an attempt to reach the runway, but in doing so, the airspeed increased
excessively. As the aircraft was being flown at speeds that were in excess of the wing flaps operation
speed, the copilot elected not to extend the flaps as instructed by the PIC. During the approach, the
Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) alerts and warnings sounded 15 times and the copilot
called for the PIC to go around.
The PIC continued the approach with flaps 5 degrees, and the aircraft attained the glideslope near the
runway 09 threshold. Flaps 5 degrees is not a landing flap setting. The aircraft crossed the threshold, 89 feet above the runway, at an airspeed of 232 knots, 98 knots faster than the required landing speed for
flaps 40 degrees. The wind was north easterly at 9 knots. The groundspeed was 235 knots. The aircraft
touched down at an airspeed of 221 knots, 87 knots faster than landing speed for 40 degrees flap.
Shortly after touching down, the copilot called, with high intonation, for the PIC to go around.
The aircraft overran the departure end of runway 09, to the right of the centerline at 110 knots. The
aircraft crossed a road, and impacted an embankment before stopping in a rice paddy field 252 meters
from the threshold of runway 27 (departure end of runway 09). The aircraft was fired by the impact
forces and an intense, fuel-fed, post-impact fire. There were 119 survivors. One flight attendant and 20
passengers were fatally injured. One flight attendant and 11 passengers were seriously injured.

The aircraft was flown at an excessive airspeed and steep flight path angle during the approach and
landing, resulting in an unstabilized approach. The PIC did not follow company procedures that
required him to fly a stabilized approach, and he did not abort the landing and go around when the
approach was not stabilized. His attention was fixated or channelized on landing the aircraft on the
runway and he either did not hear, or disregarded the GPWS alerts and warnings and calls from the
copilot to go around.

The copilot did not follow company procedures and take control of the aircraft from the PIC when he
saw that the pilot in command repeatedly ignored the GPWS alerts and warnings. The Garuda
Simulator Pilot – Proficiency Check records showed no evidence of training or proficiency checks in
the vital actions and responses to be taken in the event of GPWS or EGPWS alerts and warnings, such
as ‘TOO LOW TERRAIN’ and ‘WHOOP, WHOOP, PULL UP’.
The Garuda Basic Operation Manual instructed a copilot to take control of the aircraft from the PIC,
and execute a go around, when an unsafe condition exists.

The Directorate General of Civil Aviation’s flying operations surveillance of Garuda was not effective
in identifying these and other safety deficiencies.

The Yogyakarta Airport’s rescue and fire fighting services vehicles were unable to reach the accident
site and some did not have appropriate fire suppressant. The delay in extinguishing the fire, and the
lack of appropriate fire suppressant agents, may have significantly reduced survivability. The airport
emergency plan and its implementation were less than effective.

(…)

On 2 April 2007, Garuda issued a notice to its pilots reinforcing its mandatory policy relating to a pilot
monitoring to take control of an aircraft and execute a go around in instances of unstabilized approach,
when the pilot flying does not make an appropriate response. The notice assures pilots that the
company will not take disciplinary measures for a go around executed under any unsafe or unstabilized
approach.

Link: Final investigation report