The Cockpit Voice Recorder Transcript of the TAM Airlines Airbus A320 crashed at Sao Paulo Congonhas Airport last month has been published. It indicates that the spoilers did not activate and that the crew were unable to decelerate the aircraft after landing. The transcript confirms the pilots were aware of the non-functioning thrust-reverser and the strong possibility of a slippery runway. But however there is no evidence of a go-around attempt.
Transcript of a Honewell 30-minute solid state cockpit voice recorder, installed on TAM Airlines Airbus A320, which crashed during landing in Congonhas, Sao Paulo, Brazil on 7/17/07
LEGEND
CAM – Cockpit area microphone voice or sound source
HOT – Flight crew audio panel voice or sound source (1)
PA – Airplane Public Address system voice or sound source
FWC – Automated callout from the Flight Warming Computer
RDO – Radio transmissions from TAM flight 3054
APP – Radio transmission from Approach Control
TWR – Radio transmission from the Congonhas Control Tower
CH2 – sound heard on CVR channel 2
-1 – Voice identified as the captain/PIC
-2 – Voice identified as the first Officer/SIC
-3 – Voice identified as a Flight Attendant
-? – Voice unidentified
* – Unintelligible word
# – Expletive
@ – Non-pertinent word
( ) – Questionable insertion
[ ] – Editorial insertion
Note 1: Times are expressed Local time – reflecting a synchronization to the Flight Data Recorder using the A/P disconnect parameter from the DFDR and the tone heard on the CVR.
Note 2: Generally, only radio transmissions to and from the accident aircraft were transcribed.
Note 3: Words shown with excess vowels, letters, or drawn out syllables are a phonetic representation of the words.
Start Of Transcript
18:18:24.5 (all times are local time)
[start of recording]
18:18:24.5
PA-1 [captain makes speech to passengers]
18:18:53.4
CAM – ? [sound of whistling]
18:20:25.0
CAM [sound of flight attendant door open request]
18:20:28.1
CAM – 1 is ok?
18:20:29.7
CAM – 3 [flight attendant says that everything in the cabin is OK, and then asked where will they be landing]
18:20:33.3
CAM -1 I have just informed.
18:20:34.7
CAM – 3 I didn’t hear – sorry -her talking.
18:20:37.7
CAM -1 but she heard, Congonhas.
18:20:39.3
CAM – 3 is it Congonhas? its great so. she might have heard. thank you.
18:43:04.3
HOT -1 remember, we only have one reverse.
18:43:06.9
HOT-2 yes… only the left.
18:43:24.0
HOT-1 glideslope… LOC blue. LOC star. [LOC star means a an asterisk is displayed on the FMA, which means the loc capture]
18:43:26.6
HOT-2 checked.
18:43:27.1
HOT-1 autopilot one plus two.
18:43:29.4
HOT-1 flaps one.
18:43:30.7
HOT-2 speed checked.
18:43:36.7
HOT-1 clear status.
18:43:41.8
HOT-2 clear status.
18:43:43.8
HOT-2 clear.
18:43:48.2
RDO-2 going to intercept the localizer, TAM three zero five four.
18:43:52.2
APP TAM three zero five four, reduce speed for the approach… and call the tower on frequency one two seven point one five, good afternoon.
18:44:00.0
RDO-2 one two seven one five, over.
18:44:01.7
HOT-1 good afternoon.
18:44:06.4
HOT-1 flaps two.
18:44:08.01
CAM-2 speed checked.
18:44:20.0
HOT-2 flaps at two.
18:44:22.3
RDO-2 Sao Paulo tower, this is TAM three zero five four.
18:44:26.01
TWR TAM three zero five four, reduce minimum speed for approach, the wind is north with zero six. I will report when clear three five left.
18:44:33.4
RDO-2 good evening, reducing to the minimum possible [speed].
18:44:36.3
HOT-1 landing gear down.
18:44:37.7
HOT-2 landing gear down.
18:44:53.9
HOT-1 flaps three.
18:44:55.1
HOT-2 speed checked.
18:44:57.4
HOT-2 flaps three.
18:45:03.9
HOT-1 flap full.
18:45:05.7
CAM-2 speed checked, flaps full.
18:45:10.6
HOT-1 standby final checklist
18:45:12.0
HOT-2 standing by.
18:45:12.9
CAM-1 glide star, set missed approach altitude.
18:45:15.0
CAM-2 ALT**.
18:45:21.0
CAM-2 six thousand feet.
18:45:44.0
CAM [sound of windshield wipers operating]
18:45:52.1
CH2 [sound of outer marker beacon heard on channel 2]
18:46:03.2
HOT-1 final checklist.
18:46:04.6
HOT-2 final checklist, passing DIADEMA [name of the outer marker beacon]
18:46:10.4
PA-2 cabin crew, clear to land. [prepare for landing]
18:46: 14.0
CAM- 2 cabin crew
18:46:15.2
CAM – 1 advised.
18:46:16.00
CAM – 2 auto thrust.
18:46:18. 8
CAM 1 – speed.
18:46:20.0
CAM 2 – **-
18:46:21.1
CAM 1 – landing no blue.
18:46:22.6
CAM 1 – ECAM MEMO (Eletronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor – check memo status)
18:46:23.8
HOT-1 landing, no blue
18:46:24.9
HOT-2 landing no blue.
18:46:26.1
HOT-1 okay?
18:46: 26.7
HOT-2 okay..what?
18:46:28.6
HOT-2 okay.
18:46:30.8
HOT-? *-
18:46:30.8
HOT-2 final checklist complete.
18:46:33.8
CAM-1 runway in sight, landing.
18:46:41.7
CAM-1 ask him [the tower] about the rain condition, the runway condition, and if the runway is slippery.
18:46: 57.0
RDO-2 TAM on final approach, two miles away. could you confirm conditions?
18:47:01.7
TWR it’s wet, and it is slippery. I will report three five left clear, three zero five four.
18:47:06.1
RDO-2 already on final.
18:47:07.5
TWR the aircraft is starting the departure.
18:47:10.7
HOT-1 wet and slippery!
18:47:22.0
HOT-2 The aircraft is starting the takeoff run.
18:47: 34.3
TWR TAM three zero five four, three five left, clear to land, the runway is wet, and is slippery and the wind is three three zero at eight. knots.
18:47:40.6
HOT-2 three three zero at eight, is the wind.
18:47:42.9
HOT-1 checked.
18:47:43.9
TWR three zero five four?
18:47:45.3
RDO-2 three zero five four, roger.
18:47:46.4
FWC four hundred.
18:47:49.8
HOT-1 is the landing clear?
18:47:50.7
HOT-2 clear to land.
18:47:52.3
HOT-1 land green, manual flight.
18:47:53.7
CAM [sound of autopilot disconnect tone]
18:47:54.1
HOT-2 checked.
18:47:54.8
HOT-1 inhibit the glide [GPWS aural warning] for me please.
18:47:55.7
CAM [sound of triple click indicating reversion from CAT II or III to CAT I approach mode (manual flight approach)]
18:47:56.9
HOT-2 what?
18:47:58.8
FWC three hundred.
18:47:59.3
HOT-1 inhibit the glide for me.
18:48:00.6
HOT-2 okay.
18:48:03.0
HOT-2 inhibit.
18:48:05.8
HOT-2 middle.
18:48:11.6
FWC two hundred.
18:48:14.9
HOT-2 one dot now. okay.
18:48: 16.8
HOT-1 okay.
18:48:21.0
FWC twenty.
18:48:21.6
FWC retard.
18:48:23.0
FWC retard.
18:48:24.5
CAM [sound of trust lever movement]
18:48:24.9
CAM [sound of increase engine noise]
18:48:25:5
GPWS retard.
18:48:26:3
CAM [sound similar to touchdown]
18:48:26:7
HOT-2 reverse number one only.
18:48:29:5
HOT-2 spoliers nothing.
18:48:30:8
HOT-1 aaiii [sigh]
18:48:33:3
HOT-1 look this.
18:48:34:4
HOT-2 decelerate, decelerate.
18:48:35:9
HOT-1 it can’t, it can’t.
18:48:40:0
HOT-1 oh my god….. oh my god.
18:48:42:7
HOT-1 go, go, go, turn turn turn turn.
18:48:44:6
HOT-2 turn turn to…no, turn turn.
18:48:45:5
CAM [sound of crushing noises].
18:48:49:7
CAM-? (oh no) [male voice]
18:48:50:0
CAM [pause in crushing noises]
18:48:50:6
CAM-? [sound of scream, female voice]
18:48:50:8
CAM-? [sound of crushing noise]
[end of recording]
18:48:51:4
Hi there,
I don’t know what to think of these transcripts. At first, we don’t know exactly where they come from, as it is not in the good practices of investigation teams to let them go public before the final report is published.
Secondly, it’s hard to me to beleive the “reverse number one only” line. Ok, the crew new that one of the reverse was not working. But in such a case, it is far much better (and even probably mandatory) to NOT use the remaining one. The difference in thrust would be so much that I’m not even sure it would be manageable.
So once again, I won’t give too much credit or attention to any piece of information at this stage, and I suggest to wait in peace until the final report is published. More on my view of this incident on http://air-stories.blogspot.com
PlasticPilot
I WONT get on a plane if i know that thrust reverse is not working
ITS STUPID IF YOU DO
I THINK those son of bitches from TAM should pay millions to the families and close the airline
and the law should be NO FLY ON PLANES WITH NO THRUST REVERSE
its not about the airport
its about a characteristic of the plane that MUST BE WORKING.